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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARY DAY, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 930135-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
et al., 
Defendants-Appellees. : 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to this Court's request dated October 6, 1994, the 
Appellees submit the following response to Day's Petition for 
Rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT TROOPER COLYAR 
WOULD HAVE BEEN IMMUNE AT COMMON LAW PROM 
DAY'S CLAIMS 
This court should deny Day's petition for rehearing because 
Day has failed to show that the court incorrectly ruled that 
Trooper Colyar would have been immune at common law from Day's 
claims. In her petition, Day posits that "the common law . . . has 
always held that peace officers are liable for their negligent acts 
without regard to any discretionary/ministerial distinctions." 
Petition for Rehearing at 2. This postulate is incorrect. 
Although much police work was classified at common law as 
ministerial, numerous cases refute the notion that there was a 
1 
general rule of police liability for even discretionary conduct. 
For example, in Clinton v. Nelson, the territorial Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment of nonsuit in an action for false 
imprisonment and cruel treatment against the United States Marshall 
for the territory by a prisoner who claimed a deputy marshall 
improperly detained him in the federal penitentiary and that the 
"treatment of the prisoner was so maliciously cruel as to entitle 
him to damages." Clinton v. Nelson, 2 Utah 284, 290 (1877-80). 
The court rejected the prisoner's claim that the deputy 
improperly held him in the penitentiary, stating, "The law requires 
the marshall to safely keep such prisoners, and to do so he must 
have a reasonable discretion as to where he shall do so within his 
district." Id. The court further rejected the prisoner's claim of 
cruel treatment: "The warrant being regular, and the court having 
jurisdiction to issue it, the officer is not liable, says Hilliard, 
without proof of express malice. Hill, on Torts, 184, 3d ed. . . 
. . No such malice has been shown." Id.1 See also Marks v. 
Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 33 P. 224, 227 (1893) (dismissing claims 
against constable for assault and battery and false imprisonment 
where arrest warrant was valid on its face, even though plaintiff 
alleged constable knew warrant was void). 
Nearly half a century later, the Utah Supreme Court again 
recognized that in some circumstances, a police officer could 
xThe court also relied on the alternative rationale that "a 
ministerial officer, in performing his duties, if he acts in good 
faith, is only liable for compensatory damages for injuries against 
the law, and is not liable for exemplary damages." Clinton v. 
Nelson, 2 Utah at 290-91. 
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assert good faith or the absence of malice in defense of a claim of 
wrongful official conduct. In Roe v. Lundstrom, the court held a 
city police officer liable in trespass for acting outside the scope 
of his authority by interfering with an unlicensed retailer's sale 
of merchandise. Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1228, 1332 
(1936) . In so holding, the court stated: 
The defendants allege . . . that whatever they did was 
done in good faith and in the exercise of their best 
judgment as officers in the enforcement of the ordinances 
of Logan City . . . . The question of motive may be 
material in some cases as where the conduct is of such a 
character as to be qualifiedly privileged, or as 
involving the right to recover punitive damages. 
Id. 
Indeed, common law liability was generally not imposed on 
police officers for false arrest, false imprisonment, actions taken 
under process valid on its face, or for injury to persons to whom 
no official duty was owed. See William L. Prosser, Prosser on 
Torts §§ 25 6c 108(d) (1941). All of these privileges and 
immunities2 were ultimately grounded in notions of judicial and 
quasi-judicial immunity. They are simply specific applications of 
the broader common law rule of immunity for official discretionary 
decisions. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and 
Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 209, 219 (1963) . 
That broader immunity rule applied to all public officials, 
2These doctrines were variously called privileges and 
immunities. For example, in his 1941 hornbook, Professor Prosser 
classified both the discretionary function immunity and the 
privilege to arrest with a warrant as both privileges and 
immunities. See William L. Prosser, Prosser on Torts § 25(c) & (d) 
(privileges) and § 108(c) (immunities) (1941). 
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including police officers in their quasi-judicial role. See 
William L. Prosser, Prosser on Torts § 108(c), at 1063 & 1075 
(1941) (discussing immunities from liability for arrest and 
execution of process under general category for discretionary 
function immunity for public officers); 57 C.J. Sheriffs and 
Constables § 184 ("While the general rule of liability above stated 
applies always to breaches by a sheriff or constable of his 
ministerial duties, no liability can arise out of what he has done 
when acting in a judicial capacity, even though he has acted 
corruptly, unless he has maliciously deprived some person of his 
rights."); 70 Am. Jur. 2d Sheriffs, Police, and Constables § 158 
(1987) ("The limited immunity for discretionary conduct extended to 
public officials generally also applies to the acts of police 
officers."). 
Contrary to Day's suggestion, police officers were categorized 
as "public officials" at common law. See 47 Am. Jur. Sheriffs, 
Police, and Constables § 5 (1943) ("Peace officers are generally 
classed as public officers."). Moreover, their dual status as 
ministerial officers and discretionary or quasi-judicial officers 
was recognized. See 22 R.C.L. Public Officers § 25 (1918) ("The 
same person may act both as a judicial and a ministerial officer. 
For example, a sheriff with an execution against the property of a 
particular individual acts in executing it only as a ministerial 
officer. But the same officer when he is authorized by law to 
suppress a mob has more or less of discretionary authority 
intrusted to him."); 24 R.C.L. Sheriffs § 15 (1919) ("Under special 
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acts a sheriff may be authorized to act judicially in certain 
matters, and where he so acts, the rule applies that no judicial 
officer, however, low his grade as such, is responsible for mere 
error of judgment committed by him in the regular discharge of the 
duties of his office.") 
None of the Utah cases Day cites in her petition are 
inconsistent with the above principles. None expressly address 
immunity for police officers. More importantly, none impose 
liability on a police officer for negligent performance of a 
discretionary act within the scope of the officer's authority. 
For example, in Geros v. Harries, the court held a county 
sheriff's deputy liable for shooting a restaurant owner who fled 
the restaurant during the execution of a search and seizure 
warrant. Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227, 236 P. 220, 221 (1925). 
In so ruling, the court relied upon the common law rule that a 
police officer had authority to use force in effecting an arrest 
only when the suspect was a felon: 
[I]t must be remembered that if the [restaurant owner] 
was guilty of any crime it was at most a mere 
misdemeanor, and hence the defendants were not justified 
in shooting him, although he made or would have made his 
attempted escape effective. The law in that regard is 
clearly and correctly stated by the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi in Brown v. Weaver. It is there said: "An 
officer has no right to shoot at a person who is merely 
running away from him, without committing any violence, 
when under arrest for a misdemeanor. The wrongful 
shooting by a deputy sheriff of a prisoner attempting to 
escape from arrest for a misdemeanor is an official act 
which creates a liability on the sheriff's bond." 
Geros. 236 P. at 224 (citing Brown v. Weaver. 23 So. 388 (Miss. 
1898). Thus, the court imposed liability because the deputy 
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exceeded his authority, not because of any general rule that police 
officers were liable for even their discretionary acts.3 
That the Geros holding rests on the unlawful nature of the 
shooting, rather than on a general principle of police officer 
liability as Day contends, is further supported by the language of 
the Colorado Supreme Court in a similar case around the time Geros 
was decided. In Corder v. People, the court held a deputy sheriff 
liable for shooting and injuring a Halloween prankster. Corder v. 
People, 287 P. 85 (Colo. 1930) . In affirming a judgment for the 
injured boy, the court noted that the deputy had also been 
criminally tried and convicted of the shooting. Id. at 87. After 
determining that the shooting had been an official act, making his 
surety liable on its bond, the court concluded as follows: "The 
defendant, as the jury found, was guilty of an unlawful act in 
shooting the [prankster]. For the lawful act of a peace officer, 
of course, no liability attaches. It is only for unlawful acts 
3The A.L.R. annotators also apparently viewed the case as 
hinging upon the deputy's lack of authority to use force under the 
circumstances. They placed the court's statement that "an officer, 
when he offends, stands precisely upon the same footing as the 
citizen" under the West topic on public officers in general with a 
citation to the legal encyclopedia Ruling Case Law. See 39 A.L.R. 
1297, 1298 (headnote 8) . That reference is to an article on 
"Public Officers," which states: "Public officers are not as a 
rule personally liable for acts performed by them in the line of 
their duties . . . . But the protection extends only to acts done 
in the line of official duty. Therefore if an officer, even while 
acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on 
him by law he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a 
public agent. In the eye of the law his acts then are wholly 
without authority. It is even a doctrine of the common law that if 
a public officer abuses the process conferring authority on him to 
act he may render himself a trespasser ab initio." 22 R.C.L. 
Public Officers § 152, at 478-79 (1918). 
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that legal liability and damages are imposed." Id. at 89. 
The decision in Jackson v. Harries, also cited by Day, is 
similarly explained. There, three deputy sheriffs "used unusual 
and unnecessary force" in raiding a home to execute a search and 
seizure warrant. Jackson v. Harries, 65 Utah 282, 236 P. 234, 236 
(1925). The occupant of the home sued for "great pain and mental 
anguish." Id. at 235. Upholding a judgment for the home occupant, 
the court stated, "Officers, like others, will be protected only so 
long as they act within the law." Id. at 236. Accordingly, as in 
Geros, the deputies' liability in Jackson was based on the fact 
that their conduct exceeded their authority, not the classification 
of the conduct as ministerial or the application of a general rule 
of police liability. 
In short, the Utah cases cited by Day are consistent with the 
ministerial-discretionary function distinction applied at common 
law to all public officials.4 For all public officials, the common 
4The other cases Day cited in which the Utah court imposed 
liability on a police officer are inapposite because the conduct 
involved was clearly a ministerial function and the question of 
immunity was neither raised nor discussed on appeal. In Snell v. 
Crowe, for example, a constable was held liable in damages for 
seizing personal property of a third party under a writ of 
attachment against the property of a debtor. Snell v. Crowe. 3 
Utah 26, 5 P. 522, 523-24 (1881). But execution of civil process 
was regarded at common law as a ministerial function. See William 
L. Prosser, Prosser on Torts § 25, at 154 (1941). 
Similarly, in Benally v. Robinson, a police officer was held 
liable for fatal injuries sustained by an intoxicated detainee who 
fell through an open door down some stairs in the booking area of 
the jail. Benally v. Robinson, 14 Utah 2d 6, 376 P.2d 388, 389-90 
(1962) . On appeal, the officer argued that he had no duty to 
protect an intoxicated person from injury and the court rejected 
that argument, holding that once the officer took the detainee into 
custody, the officer assumed the duty to use due care to protect 
the detainee from harm. Id. at 390. The issue of immunity was not 
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law immunity for discretionary functions applied only to acts 
within the scope of the official's authority. Absent such 
authority, the official had no power to commit the act at all, 
whether or not the act involved discretion or judgment. See, e.g. . 
Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1228, 1131 (1936) (holding 
three city commissioners liable in trespass, stating, l! [A public 
officer] may not . . . claim immunity for the commission of an act 
entirely outside the scope of his official duties). 
Moreover, the treatises and articles Day cites do not 
generally support her claim of an all-inclusive rule of police 
liability. Most merely recite specific categories of police 
conduct which have been classified as ministerial, none of which 
apply to Day's claims against Trooper Colyar. For example, 
Professor Jaffe's 1963 law review article states that 
there are areas, notably actions against police officers 
for false arrest, battery, and trespass . . . where 
recovery has long been allowed, despite the exercise by 
the officer of more than a "merely ministerial" function. 
This is particularly clear in the case of police officer, 
who are called upon to make extremely difficult factual 
choices, and important, if unarticulated, policy 
decisions: for example, whether to regard certain 
conduct or certain appearances as sufficient evidence to 
arrest or search. 
Jaffe, supra, at 218-19. Professor Jaffe goes on to say, however, 
In fact the law recognizes the discretionary element here 
raised on appeal, nor does it appear to have been a valid defense 
since in booking a detainee into jail the officer was performing a 
standard police function that was not even arguably discretionary. 
Thus, Benally is consistent both with the general common law rule 
of official liability for ministerial functions and the common law 
classification of most police functions as ministerial; it does not 
rest on any general principle of police officer liability for 
negligence acts. 
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when in its definition of the power to arrest it 
immunizes certain "reasonable" judgments of the officer. 
However, the officer's immunity is limited to his 
reasonable actions; it is not that total immunity usual 
in an area classified as discretionary. 
Id. at 219. To the extent that any of the secondary authorities 
cited by Day appear to state a general rule of police liability, 
they can be explained as implicitly limited to ministerial police 
functions. Moreover, whatever the law elsewhere, the existence of 
a general rule of police liability in Utah must be seriously 
doubted in light of the decisions in Clinton v. Nelson, 2 Utah at 
290, and Roe v. Lundstrom, 57 P.2d at 1332. Given the unique 
history of this state, this court cannot validly assume that the 
decisions of other American common law courts at or near the time 
of Utah's statehood signify what the Utah court would have decided 
at that time. See generally, Jerrold S. Jensen, The Common Law of 
England in the Territory of Utah, 60 Utah Historical Quarterly 4 
(Winter 1992) (discussing general suspicion and even hostility of 
early Utah courts toward common law tradition). 
In deciding that Trooper Colyar would have been immune from 
Day's claims under early Utah common law, this court noted that 
"the parties have not cited any Utah caselaw from near the time of 
statehood which addresses immunity for police officers, and we have 
not found any." Day v. State, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 22 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) . In her petition for rehearing, Day still has not cited 
any Utah case law expressly addressing police officer immunity at 
common law. On the other hand, Clinton v. Nelson. 2 Utah at 290, 
and Roe v. Lundstrom, 57 P.2d at 1332, appear to recognize a 
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discretionary function immunity for police officers in Utah near 
the turn of the nineteenth century. 
Moreover, in the absence of Utah cases on point from the 
relevant era, this court must "simply [make its] best assessment of 
what a court during that era would have ruled if the issue had 
arisen." Day, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23. As this court noted, in 
recent decisions courts have declined to impose liability on police 
officers under the circumstances of this case. Day v. State, 247 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 23 (citing Tice v. Cramer, 627 A.2d 1090, 1108 
(N.J. 1993) and Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655, 665 (Kan. 1983)); 
see also Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992) (en 
banc). As numerous commentators have noted, the application of the 
ministerial-discretionary function distinction has always been 
essentially a policy determination. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra, at 
291. While high speed vehicles are relatively new, "the need to 
encourage the pursuit and apprehension of lawbreakers" is timeless. 
See Day, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. Thus, absent controlling 
precedent, this court may properly rely on the policy 
determinations of contemporary decisions in assessing what the Utah 
court would have decided if it had addressed a similar case around 
the turn of the last century. 
In any event, if this court has any serious doubt whether 
Trooper Colyar would have been held liable for Day's claims at 
common law, it must reject Day's claim that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act violates the open courts clause. "The party attacking 
the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of affirmatively 
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demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional." Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) . Unless 
Day can affirmatively establish that the Utah Supreme Court would 
have sustained her claim nearly a century ago, she cannot establish 
the existence of any right shielded by the open courts clause. 
Day, 247 Utah Adv. Rep. at 23. 
POINT II 
DAY HAS WAIVED THE ISSUE OP TROOPER COLYAR'S 
COMMON LAW LIABILITY BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY 
ADDRESS THE ISSUE IN EITHER HER OPENING OR 
REPLY BRIEF 
Day has waived her arguments concerning the common law 
liability of police officers by failing to assert them at any time 
before filing her petition for rehearing. This court has held many 
times that it will not consider issues inadequately briefed either 
in the trial court or on appeal. See, e.g. , State v. Scott, 860 
P.2d 1005, 1007 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (declining to consider 
inadequately briefed state constitutional issue). 
Moreover, as noted in Point I above, M[t]he party attacking 
the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of affirmatively 
demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional." Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993). Thus, 
in asserting her claim under the open courts clause, it was 
incumbent upon Day to adequately demonstrate that her claim 
implicated a right protected by the open courts clause. 
Despite numerous opportunities to do so, Day never briefed her 
claim that she had a common law remedy against Trooper Colyar until 
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she filed her petition for rehearing. As initially noted in the 
State's opening brief in this appeal, Day never cited any authority 
in her opening brief for the proposition that she had a legal 
remedy for her injuries at common law at the time of statehood. 
Brief of State Appellees, at 30. That deficiency was not corrected 
in Day's reply brief on this appeal. Nor in her letter to the 
court filed under Rule 24 (j) after oral argument was held in this 
case# did Day cite any of the authorities she now cites in her 
petition for rehearing. See Letter from Craig L. Boorman to Clerk 
of the Court dated May 17, 1994 (responding to State's Rule 24 (j) 
citations). The remaining arguments Day raises in her petition for 
rehearing also come too late. 
Day's theory of liability has shifted with each successive 
filing in this case. It continues to shift even now. See Motion 
to File Supplement to Appellant's Petition for Rehearing dated 
October 27, 1994. This court should apply its well-established 
waiver doctrine and deny Day's petition for rehearing. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should deny Day's petition for rehearing because 
Day has failed to show that Trooper Colyar would not have been 
protected under early Utah common law by discretionary function 
immunity. Contrary to Day's claim in her petition for rehearing, 
near the turn of the nineteenth century, the Utah court recognized 
police immunity for discretionary conduct. The Utah cases cited by 
Day are inapposite because they concern police conduct outside the 
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scope of authority -- conduct for which any public official would 
have been liable. 
In any event, Day has waived her argument concerning Trooper 
Colyar's common law liability by failing to raise it before now. 
The other arguments raised in Day's petition have similarly been 
waived. 
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